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Security and Conspiracy in Modern History 
Cornel Zwierlein & Beatrice de Graaf ∗ 
Abstract: »Sicherheit und Verschwörung in der Neuzeit«. Security History is a 
new field in historical research. Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theories have at-
tracted since some years great attention, both in historical and in social re-
search. A thorough study of those both opposed and mirroring key phenomena 
and concepts does not exist. This contribution tries to outline a sketch of the 
development of their interwoven history, how (imagined) conspiracies chal-
lenged new means of security production and vice versa. The main assumption 
is that a) a translocal public sphere, b) concepts, practices and means of institu-
tionalized security production, and c) developed narratives that contain con-
spiracy theories only emerge together from the Renaissance onwards. Only if 
there is a public sphere in which conspiracy theories can circulate anonymously 
they become themselves an element of historical agency. Security as a leading 
principle of politics emerges only with the development of the state. The con-
tribution outlines the steps of change from confessional age to Enlightenment, 
to the Revolutionary age and to Modernity, identifying mainly two important 
systematic changings which affect the security/conspiracy combination (Emer-
gence of observability alongside the politics/religion and Ancien Ré-
gime/Bourgeois Society distinctions). It finally asks if there is currently happen-
ing a third epochal shift of comparable importance. 
Keywords: security, security history, conspiracy, conspiracy theory, communica-
tion history, information public sphere, Antichrist, confessional age, Renais-
sance, Enlightenment, revolution, Modernity, late Modernity, theory of epochs. 
1.  Introduction 
Conspiracy theories circulating widely beyond local face-to-face communities, 
concerning unclear, hidden but powerful threats to the security of the state, its 
citizens or a community are a modern phenomenon in Europe. It is modern 
because the constellation combining a) a translocal public sphere, b) concepts, 
practices and means of institutionalized security production, and c) developed 
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narratives that contain conspiracy theories only emerges together from the 
Renaissance onwards. Ancient times perhaps knew of such circulating texts, 
but what has been transmitted to us are only public orations denouncing con-
spiracies and historical writings that describe conspiracies and rumors about 
them circulating in society. This HSR Special Issue starts with that statement 
about a historical specificity of the combined phenomena of conspiracy and 
security and thus it embeds them in a wider context of a renewed Security 
History. Being sensitive to the constructive and conditioning power of lan-
guage, semantics and narration in a narrower sense, and communication and 
media support in a broader, it is also the conviction of the editors – shared in 
nearly all of the contributions – that the history of security and conspiracy can 
best be understood by carefully looking from a triangular perspective: Means 
of security production, state institutions, and certainly the public where both 
security discourses and conspiracy narratives circulate, obey the historical 
conditions of communication devices. There is, to our knowledge, no attempt 
hitherto in historical and social research to bind together the opponents of secu-
rity and conspiracy in this way, attempting to give an outline of their develop-
ment in modern history.  
Security History is experiencing its take off these days. Regarding the field 
of internal security and policing, the 19th century already saw the rise and 
consolidation of an academic and professional discipline – but there was never 
a ‘security history’ linked to it. On an international plane, security studies only 
emerged in the 1940s, when Political Sciences and International Relations were 
developed as a distinct field of research and education in the U.S. Since then, 
security studies are an inter-disciplinary field of expertise for military strategy, 
politics, foreign affairs and coordination of military and non-military tools of 
defense that has been established as a subdiscipline of academic International 
Relations (Wæver 2010; Zwierlein 2012; De Graaf and Zwierlein 2013). As 
that field is strongly connected to politics itself, this development clearly has its 
roots in the changing perceptions of the field of security politics: international 
and domestic aspects of security became entangled through the coining of the 
term “social security” during the Roosevelt administration. This marked not 
only a shift in notions but also in content. In the post World War II period, a 
series of new notions of national and international security followed one anoth-
er (“national security” itself, “extended security”, “common security”, “global 
security”, “cooperative security” and “comprehensive security”, cf. Zwierlein 
and Graf 2010). From the 1970s onwards, sociology and philosophy both de-
veloped branches of “security sociology” (Kaufmann 1973). But in historical 
sciences, no corresponding field existed; only very recently can we recognize a 
claim for establishing such a field in historical research.  
Conspiracies and conspiracy theories are not generally, or at least not com-
monly, directly opposite terms to “security” like for example “threat” or “risk”. 
But they are one possible threat in a given community or institutional frame-
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work: No conspiracy or conspiracy theory is imaginable as a threat to an indi-
vidual without such a framework. The lone individual who is planning the 
murder of another mere individual is, literally not con-spiring against him 
because the term necessitates something like the activation of an environment 
(at least two against one). In history and theory, we mostly speak of a conspira-
cy only with respect to the consensual action of a larger group within a given 
commonwealth against a public person or institution; even more, conspiracy 
theories mostly refer to such more complex constellations. So, already by that 
choice of the two opponents, the focus and the questions of this issue are nar-
rowed down thematically, and as will be argued later, also epochally.  
While the first contribution by Beatrice de Graaf (De Graaf and Zwierlein 
2013) will outline the approach in this HSR Special Issue from the methodo-
logical point of view of Foucauldian dispositive theory and in dialogue with 
political science, the contribution by Cornel Zwierlein on the Renaissance 
history of security and conspiracy (Zwierlein 2013) contains in the first part a 
general discussion of the existing definitions of “conspiracy/conspiracy theory” 
in historical research, and it develops the thesis of the Renaissance as starting 
point for the above-mentioned combination. The task here is to prepare that 
methodological and historical introduction by a short sketch of the major de-
velopments of the opposition of “security and conspiracy” in modern history 
(Section 2) followed by an overview of historical research on the topic (or 
rather both topics) in a longue durée sense, also trying to explain why there are 
some important gaps (Section 3), before only very briefly summarizing the 
consecution and connection of the contributions in this special issue (Section 4). 
2.  Security and Conspiracy: Elements of Historical 
 Development 
If both topics alone – security and conspiracy – are relatively new issues in 
historical research, this is even more true for their combination and confronta-
tion. That leads quickly to the problem that one cannot rely on an already exist-
ing master narrative of their correlated development through history, not even 
if we restrict ourselves to European history. 
2.1  Greek and Roman Dispositions and the Renaissance as  
Starting Point 
Before concentrating on the transition to modern history, let us first have a look 
at ancient history because, for both notions and concepts, “securitas” and “con-
spiracy”, the Renaissance was able to revive ancient Greek and Roman notions, 
perceptions, and forms of communication and practices. The same does not 
apply to the institutional realities behind the notions, but nevertheless it is 
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important not to neglect the ancient roots, so as not to construct the novelty and 
specificity of the modern configuration in a misleading way. Roisman (2006) 
shows how the problem of conspiracies was a daily topic of political rhetoric: 
“epibouleuein”, “symprattein”, “symparaskeuazein” are synonyms which may 
be translated as conspiratorial activity, stressing either the cognitive element of 
joint planning or the practical element of joint preparation and action. If the 
comedians, foremost Aristophanes, already showed how conspiratorial argu-
ments were usual in daily oral culture in Athens, the theme becomes salient in 
the orations of Lysias, Demosthenes, Aeschines with some reflections in Thu-
cydides, mostly for the period around 400 B.C., both for “internal” and “exter-
nal” affairs: During the state of war between Athens and Sparta in 415, 411 and 
404, the threat of an internal Athenian conspiracy of oligarchs against the free-
dom of the city was openly discussed many times. Past historians have often 
discussed whether those charges of conspiracy were true or not; for Roisman as 
well as for us in this context, it is more important that the issue of conspiracy 
itself was a daily topic. Members of the political elite accused each other of 
conspiring against the republic and its government for idealistic as well as for 
strategic purposes (to prove themselves good servants of the state); the speech-
es of the orators are full of these narratives. Of similar interest are the (pre-
sumed) conspiracies relating to the opposition between Athenian democracy 
and an outside tyrant: the accusation was always that there were agents within 
their own state collaborating with an external power, thus threatening the Athe-
nian constitution (e.g. Aeschines as the city’s envoy to the Macedonian king 
Philip in 346 B.C. conspiring against his own polis). We find here explicitly the 
formula that  
Outside are the plotters; inside, the collaborators [exothen hoi epibouleuontes, 
endothen hoi symprattontes]. It is the plotters who give and the collaborators 
who take or rescue those who have taken (Demosthenes 19.297-9, transl. and 
cit. after Roisman 2006, 118).  
But in the Greek sources, the threat of this conspiracy and plotting-together 
(“epibouleuein”, “symprattein” and derivatives) is normally directed against 
“the polis”, “freedom”, the commonwealth or constitution – not against some 
equivalent to “security”. What would become the Latin “se-curus” was in its 
Greek original (ataraxía, eumeleia, euthymia etc.) related to either Epicurean or 
Stoic philosophy and ethics, and as such apparently restricted to the realm of 
individual or interpersonal action. Even where the sources (such as a speech by 
Antiphon) relate to “conspiring” (epibouleuein) against the life of an individu-
al, it seems to have been unusual to name an abstract “sphere” of security en-
veloping the person as being violated or threatened by conspiratorial actions 
and plans; more directly, the texts formulate a threat against the body and per-
son itself without a medium element. The Greek tradition of anti-tyrannical 
conspiracy rhetoric was first re-activated during the Florentine Renaissance 
(Latin translation by Leonardo Bruni), but it was only received more widely at 
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the end of the 16th century and probably played no great role during the forma-
tive moment of the Early Modern conspiracy pattern, which was fed rather by a 
hybrid of the medieval and ancient Roman coniuratio semantics. But the case 
of Thomas Wilson’s English translation of Demosthenes in 1570, very well 
studied by Blanshard and Sowerby (2005), is very telling, as it shows how the 
Athenian anti-tyrannical rhetoric against Philip of Macedonia could be blended 
with the English Protestant anti-tyrannical rhetoric against Philip II of Spain 
and the fear of a general anti-Protestant European conspiracy in the 1560s: so 
the Greek tradition enters exactly when the fully developed confessional con-
spiracy theory pattern has emerged (on which see Zwierlein 2013).1 
In the case of Rome, some conspiracies even have a mythical status. Pagán 
2004 is one of the later works on conspiracy in ancient Rome, concentrating 
exactly on the issue of how (betrayed and successful) conspiracies were narrat-
ed by the ancient historians (Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, Appian...), and less on how 
conspiracy was an issue of common discourse; so no analysis of Ciceronian 
rhetoric that would be the exact parallel to Roisman’s analysis of Athenian 
political rhetoric; nevertheless the reflections on the construction of conspiracy 
narratives are useful. The Catilinarian conspiracy as well as the conspiracy that 
prepared the murder of Caesar belonged to the European memorial heritage of 
all times, it is not our aim to enumerate here all the receptions and rewritings of 
those arch-conspiracies in the Middle Ages, Early Modern and Modern Times. 
But it is important to note that the common notion used to denote it in Latin 
was “coniuratio”, not “conspiratio”. “Conspiratio” has, with Cicero for exam-
ple, mostly a positive sense of “consensus” and “spiritual concord”; only rarely 
does it occur in its negative political sense in Cicero’s letters, in Tacitus, Sue-
tonius. The medieval manuscripts and early modern editions of Sallust are 
normally inscribed like C. Crispi Sallustii de coniuratione Catilinae (...), which 
was the common medieval term and which still served Angelo Poliziano for his 
famous description of the Renaissance Pazzi conspiracy against Lorenzo de’ 
Medici (Pactianae coniurationis commentarium, 1478). Cicero also used “co-
niuratio” as the key term in the Catilinarian orations (cf. only I Catilin. par. 1). 
German translations of Sallust used for “coniuratio” terms like “Bund-
schuch/Rottung oder Empörung wider eyn Obergkeyt” (Sallust, transl. 
Schrayer 1534), which was exactly the terminology used in 1525 by the princes 
                                                             
1 It should be noted that the first complete edition with Latin translation (by Hieronymus 
Wolf) of Demosthenes’ orations was only published in 1572, and the first Greek edition in 
1504 in Venice (Aldus Manutius). This Latin translation quite seldom used the translations 
“coniuratio/conspiratio” for the terms that Roisman (2006) identified in his analysis as 
markers of conspiracy thinking. The crucial passage cited above (“exothen...”), for example, is 
translated by Wolf as “Foris sunt qui insidientur, intus qui iuuent insidiatores.” (Demosthe-
nes 1572, 240a). But we do indeed find “per conspirationem [...] facta” as a translation for 
“syntaxámenoi” (ibid., 465). Nevertheless: the late translation happened just at the moment 
when we identify the take-off of full-scale confessional conspiracy theories.  
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and magistrates to denounce the Peasants’ Revolt. The term “conspira-
cy/conspiratio” itself and its derivatives became of common usage seemingly 
only in the political language of the Western Wars of Religion from the 1560s 
onwards, with some early uses during the German Protestant princes’ struggle 
and the war against the Turks (1530s, 1540s). There is, for example, no Euro-
pean 15th-century Incunabulum bearing a title (colophon) with that term. If 
pamphlets and other printed work then denounce, in the second half of the 16th 
century, a “Papal, Turk or Antichrist conspiracy”, it seems obvious that the 
important step that had to be taken for the entry into modern history of conspir-
acies and conspiracy theory was the development of something which we 
might call – using a certainly anachronistic systematic term – a political theol-
ogy during the age of confessional schism: con-spiratio, now in a negative 
connotation, seems to have expressed better the metaphysical (divine or Anti-
christ) element of these presumed collaborations of men and supernatural pow-
ers. 
The development of “security” as a leading term of modern history and poli-
tics does not follow that scheme (having no necessary link to spiritual powers), 
but goes chronologically in parallel with it. The main steps are as follows: 
“securitas” as a notion of Roman imperial politics since the 1st century A.D.; 
loss of importance of “securitas” through the Middle Ages; recovering of “se-
curitas” as a guiding principle of politics with the rise of the Italian territorial 
state and the early interterritorial state system since the 15th century; then the 
spread of it following the configuration of the state/state system and its related 
political language throughout Europe. 
“Securitas” in the meaning of care-free (and also care-less) is a term restrict-
ed to the realm of individual ethics, like “apatheia” and “asphaleia” in Greek 
philosophy. It is present as such in Cicero (De officiis): “Whereas with Cicero 
the notion of securitas tends to adhere to the private realm, with the collapse of 
the Roman Republic the term begins to be employed in a decidedly public 
fashion” (Hamilton 2013, 62). Velleius Paterculus uses it to denote the 
achievements of the emperors in removing the threats of civil war. Under Nero, 
the goddess “securitas” received her own altar in the forum and from that time 
on figured on coins and in texts such as Macrobius as a virtue of the emperors 
together with Concordia, Libertas, Salus, Pax, Fides Exercituum, Victoria 
(Haase 1981, 903-4; Instinsky 1952). So, as a political agenda, it is an imperial 
term, not a republican one: it is linked to the general peace guaranteed by the 
emperors within the empire and is, as such, specifically a post-civil war term. 
One may introduce, then, as a guiding argument for the distinction between the 
Middle Ages and modern times, the idea that during the Middle Ages, it was 
inter-personality that counted; as such the prevailing notion is pax, mostly 
traced back to pactum, a relationship between two persons, not a status in a 
(spatial) sphere. Indeed, “securitas” as a term occurred in the Middle Ages 
normally either in semantic relationship with such interpersonal relationships 
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or it was related already to “space”: security in a city with city walls (Schuster 
2006), “securities” as the name for escorts or safeguard letters for voyages. But 
all in all it was a rather rare notion, completely overshadowed by “peace” and 
all its derivatives. As we have said, this changed with the emergence of the 
state as a transpersonal, more and more spatially conceived entity that necessi-
tated the development of a differentiation of the concept along “internal” and 
“external” lines during the Renaissance in Italy. Only later it was to be found 
elsewhere in Europe – wherever the constellation of statehood, state communi-
cation, interterritorial state relationships through steady diplomacy, and dis-
patch communication spread. Until now, conceptual history has linked this 
constellation of security and the state system (since Conze 1984) to Hobbes and 
has temporarily located it within the 17th century. But the identification of that 
moment is derived too much from intellectual history and does not enquire into 
the conditioning structures behind the developments in political language (and 
afterwards in systematic treatises by great philosophers). 
2.2  Public Sphere Plus Antichrist: The Confessional Age 
We have to add a third element to our observations on the mirroring notions of 
security and conspiracy, that was put at the very beginning of this introduction 
as the first point: it is the “public”, but rather a public of information communi-
cation and not the emerging public sphere and public opinion with its critical 
function to criticize and correct government or princes as we know it especially 
from Jürgen Habermas. Conspiracy theories in a modern-era sense are only 
imaginable under the conditions of the existence of the “public” as a separate 
communication area with its own rules, particularly with the possibility of very 
frequent anonymous production and reception of news, texts, propaganda mate-
rial etc. The earlier public theory and public history, as inspired by the Ameri-
can “public opinion” school and then especially by Habermas (repeatedly), 
with a striking new boom after 1989 when Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit 
was translated into English (Habermas 1989; Calhoun 1992), was chiefly con-
cerned with the emergence of a critical “counter-power” in the sense of a pre-
history of democratic societies or, one might say, a democratic semi-institution, 
the “fourth power”. Early reception in particular, also in the field of history, 
was concerned with this (ruler-) critical function of the “public” – for example 
in the discussion about the reformatory public (the state of research is largely 
unchanged since the summary by Talkenberger in 1994), in the discussion 
about the urban public and its critical function (Würgeler 1995; 2009), or the 
enquiry into the function of criticism of the absolutist government model in 
various forums and forms in the 18th century (Gestrich 1994). International 
research, particularly after 1989, took up this thread and inquired into the criti-
cal function of the public in the course of the French Revolution, hereby ex-
tending the perspective to certain groups which had been neglected in the orig-
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inal conception of the model (Calhoun 1992; 2010). Theoretical criticism of the 
model itself was expressed variously: for example, criticism of the space meta-
phor in the “public” model (Mah 2000). However, it was overlooked for a long 
time that the presupposition for public criticism, i.e. an information public 
sphere, was positioned chronologically earlier and should perhaps be viewed as 
more fundamental in its effects, even if those effects were not particularly 
visible (Dooley 1999; 2010; Woolf 2001; Zwierlein 2006, 208-72, 557-610; De 
Vivo 2007, 57ff.; Landi 2006). The communication of criticism – from cau-
tious clerical or courtly correctiones principis right through to revolutionary 
pamphlets –, in the context of a public which aims to restrain or even topple a 
changing regime, is only possible on the basis of constantly circulating obser-
vational information about the current state of the observed (and then perhaps 
criticized) system (Luhmann 1992). In our context, this becomes a significant 
argument in several ways: firstly with regard to the media form in which public 
information creates the present: conspiracy theories require a particular form of 
present-perception to “train” a form of present-analysis and future planning 
which is then used parasitically by conspiracy theories, both in its narrative and 
in its conceptual form. This has to exist in order for a division to exist into the 
areas of the empirically possible, the metaphysically possible and the various 
forms of “fictionality”, i.e. the prerequisites for various forms of conspiracy 
narratives (Zwierlein 2013). Secondly, and more generally, the information 
public sphere creates a perception of a) the continually changing positions on 
the “chessboard of Europe” (or to use the metaphor of the times: on the the-
atrum Europae), with their own internal logic; and b) the structure of the per-
ception that all political and reportable actors (including kings) also experience 
themselves as observers observed by the anonymous, independently communi-
cating realm of information public sphere, generates – consciously or uncon-
sciously – an impression among the observers which one might initially call a 
system-inclusion and at the same time a system-instability experience and 
which can be described by certain characteristics: a) consciousness of the inte-
gration of the actors into a larger conglomerate, characterized by dynastic-
political, confessional, or economic logics of connection and division; b) plan-
nability, and at the same time limitation of this plannability by system contin-
gencies in this field; c) consciousness of connections and (causal, conditional) 
interdependencies over large areas.  
It is not necessary here to presuppose any logical-rational calculation, or to 
use the word system/sistema etc. for a state, economic, confessional or political 
system or for a general European system, even if we can note the use of this 
body of words for various areas at various times in the early modern era. The 
important point is that the information public sphere enables a quiet conscious-
ness to emerge that there are superordinate factors and interdependencies, 
which may be difficult to trace, understand or predict, but to which all actors, 
even the most powerful rulers of the time, are subject; that clearly none of the 
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visible actors has complete control of the system any more, neither the Pope 
nor the Emperor. This initially opens up a new emotional space to be filled 
with fear and worry about the security and stability of the whole and its parts, 
to which the binomial of “security” and “conspiracy” can attach itself: it is only 
in this space that modern conspiracy theories can then introduce “super-causal 
instances”. The fear of a lack of real controllability of the system generates 
fearful images of a secret power which in fact controls everything. The possi-
bility of such super-causal instances as an inversion of the lack of complete 
control of the “system which is bigger than the sum of its parts”, as perceived 
daily in the information public sphere, is thus also surely the actual differentia-
tion criterion when asking which security/conspiracy constellation is only 
imaginable since the modern era. The threat to the security of an entire system, 
not just to a single actor or to a form of state, seems to be new.  
This therefore very significant information public sphere also emerged in 
the Renaissance at the same time as, and as a side-effect of, state and interstate 
communication, i.e. also at the same time as the increase in significance of 
security and conspiracy. It was fully developed relatively early on, chiefly 
based on professionalized hand-written paper and post communication. 
Through these channels, texts and mass pamphlets could repeatedly circulate 
which strengthened the critical function of the public, even in the early modern 
era (in the Reformation, the Wars of Religion, the Civil Wars, the Fronde, etc); 
and conspiracy theories, too, could by their appellative tendency transport 
criticism of rulers. However, there was a tendency from the 15th to the 18th 
century for the descriptive and observational function of public information to 
have quantitative and effective priority over the (always indicated) potential for 
public criticism within the same framework. 
Although the Renaissance was therefore the incubation period for the mod-
ern-era security/conspiracy relationship as we understand it, the first full – in 
the sense of previously developed – version, and therefore also the matrix or 
paradigm, of the modern-era conspiracy theory is the confessional-
transnational form which became prominent from the 1560s with the Western 
European Wars of Religion and which, in various forms, described a central 
confessional conspiracy instance controlling the whole of European politics 
and which could then be theologically identified with the Antichrist. Crouzet 
(1990), Kaufmann (2003), Leppin (1999) and others have reconstructed the 
general apocalyptic consciousness during the confessional age. It is important 
to precise and narrow down that question to apocalypticism as interpretative 
framework within the European State System and within a transnational public 
sphere. Confessional-political actors and actions were indentified causally with 
the intentional plans of the Antichrist super-instance, whether they were the 
Pope or the amorphous mass of the Protestant network with their central plan-
ners in Wittenberg or Geneva. They ultimately threatened the security of the 
entire “system”, not only of one state, one king or one confession. In this mix-
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ture of spiritual-theological elements and European state system-specific ele-
ments was exactly that surplus which reacted to the new system-inclusion and 
system-instability consciousness described above. This macrostructure could 
then be transformed into the microstructure of each respective social field of 
conflict or local milieu which has been studied by Crouzet (1990) in detail or 
by Roberts (2004). At this point, instead of giving a sequence of examples, we 
refer to Pohlig (2002), Lake (2004, with further literature p. 109, Note 5 on 
Elizabethan anti-Popery), Clifton (1973), Pillorget (1988), Coster (1999), 
Wood (1982), Onnekink (2007) for England in the 17th and 18th century, and 
Zwierlein (2013).  
2.3  From the 18th Century to the Late 19th Century 
Continuing our rough sketch of the development of “security and conspiracy” 
(and the third hidden engine, the media environment), we must find a place for 
the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, because research on conspiracy 
thinking and conspiracy theories concentrated early on that period. Hofstadter 
coined the influential thesis of the “paranoid style” of politics, beginning exact-
ly with the American Revolution and Independence Wars of the 1770s. Later, 
historians like François Furet and Lynn Hunt continued to concentrate on that 
period, identifying conspiratorial discourses as a specificity of the Revolution 
period (Furet 1981; Hunt 1984); this research has continued until now (Tackett 
2000; Campbell, Kaiser and Linton 2007). During the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution – at least to the extent that research has highlighted until 
now – the element of political theology lost (much of) its salience. At first 
glance this is not surprising, but let us exemplify it with some observations 
about the notorious Histoire des conjurations, conspirations et révolutions 
célebres, tant anciennes que modernes by François Joachim Duport Dutertre 
and Desormeaux (10 vols., 1754-1760). 
Dutertre (1715-1759), classified as one of France’s 18th-century journalists 
(Dictionnaire des journalistes, 1600-1789: a correspondant of Malesherbes), 
presents this work as a sober historical narrative for which he did not undertake 
a huge amount of his own research of sources: “only the form [e.g. the interpre-
tative framework] is mine” (Dutertre 1754, I, vi). The short general remarks on 
the topic of his 10-volume enterprise reveal that for Dutertre, a conjuration is 
always a complot of some men against the present government of a republic or 
a monarchy. He does not mention special transnational elements of such a plot. 
The fact that – after a first chronological attempt – he decided from the second 
volume onwards to gather all the conjurations of one nation into one volume 
shows that he always has the ideal-type of coup d’état against the legitimate 
government in mind, close and often identical to a revolt, led by a conspiracy 
peer group, mostly headed by an “anti-hero” chief which he judges as evil. He 
starts with some classical “conjurations” of ancient history, notably the Catili-
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narian one, and then lists for the Holy Roman Empire, for example, the Huss-
ites of Bohemia against Emperor Wenceslaus, “the Anabaptists”, and Wallen-
stein against Emperor Ferdinand II. Under “Anabaptistes”, Dutertre gives a 
strange combination of the Peasants’ war of 1525, the revolt of the Nobles of 
1522 and the Anabaptist kingdom of Münster of 1534/35. For Italy he has, 
among others, accounts of the attempt by Cola di Rienzi to create a new repub-
lic of Rome, the conjuration of the Pazzi, famous since the above-mentioned 
treatise of Poliziano, the conjuration of Fiesco against the Doria in Genova, and 
the Sicilian Vespers; in other volumes, instead of adding single conjurations as 
separate chapters, he simply presents the accumulated stories of “all” conjura-
tions in France, Spain, Naples, England, Japan, Portugal, Turkey etc. For 
France, the Huguenot uprising is a whole story of conjuration, after that the 
assassination attempts of Jean Chastel and Ravaillac against Henri IV, and he 
ends with some plots from the reign of Louis XIII, perhaps prudently not 
touching on topics like the Fronde, still too “hot” to be touched.  
What we have here, in the middle of the 18th century, is already something 
like a canonical collection of classical archetypes of conjurations and conspira-
cies. But it is obvious that from this (rather mediocre) 18th-century perspective 
on conjurations, nearly every critical opposition, revolt, critical group and 
action directed against the given order was treated under that name. The reli-
gious motivational factors for the 16th/17th-century events are regularly re-
vealed as “fanaticism”, which means that the 18th-century author excludes by 
definition transcendental powers as causal actors – in contrast to the former 
Antichrist conspiracy theories from the confessional age. Durtertre’s work is a 
compilatory expansion of the classical conjuration history genre since Sallust 
rather than a history of conspiracy theories. So, it just gives an account of his-
torical conjuration events which may have been accompanied by a conspirato-
rial discourse – he is not very interested in its circulation, in the power of those 
texts and concepts themselves. But the underlying general approach shows that 
not only within the elite of sharp-tongued rationalist Enlightenment, but also on 
the level of obedient pro-monarchical journalistic ‘enlighten-tainment’ (if we 
may use that neologism to characterize that level of discourse), the range of 
probability of conspiracy theories to be formulated, to circulate and to be suc-
cessful was perhaps widened with respect to the spatial range of interdepend-
ency of political actions, but strongly reduced with respect to the transcendental 
agency factors mentioned (cf. Campbell 2004, 200). The one security that is 
threatened by those conjurations here was the security of the state, maybe the 
nation state in its early modern form as the “patrie” of the king’s or the repub-
lic’s people, but not yet the revolutionary nation tout court (cf. Schmidt 2007). 
Certainly, one would quickly find the use of “conjuration/conspiration” and 
“sécurité” at that time applied to every imaginable smaller community and 
situation, but it is nevertheless telling that if an author writes a general history 
of conjurations and conspiracies, he automatically thinks only on that level of 
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state security.2 Tackett 2000 also remembered that only very seldom did phi-
losophers like Voltaire or Montesquieu or even practitioners of politics refer to 
conspiracies. So, at first glance, the 18th century seems to be a return to pre-
confessional times with respect to security/conspiracy – with the exception of 
the proto-nation as the threatened realm of security.  
If we emphasized above the development of a system-consciousness in the 
framework of, and by means of, Europe-wide political public information about 
political, confessional, economic and other interdependencies as being specific 
to the modern era, this seems not to have changed. Indeed, summarizing the 
assessments of Bercé and Campbell (cf. n. 2) to the effect that the 18th century 
saw a decrease in the occurrence of larger state complots and a shift towards 
intrigue and cabal, it initially seems that a part of this consciousness was lost, 
or lost significance: in relation to the European state system itself, a certain 
stabilization had taken place, such that the conglomerate now seemed to the 
scholars of the 18th century to be a real, orderly system (Muhlack 2006; Kluet-
ing 1986; Schilling 1994; Schroeder 1994; Duchhardt 1997; Thompson 2011), 
in which the dynastic-political power relationships were so clear, and moreover 
the large states and rulers were so undisputedly the only decisive actors that 
there was now hardly any perception of contingency which might lead to an 
impulse of fear.3 A “super-causal instance” beyond the interests of princes and 
rulers thus seemed no longer plausible, so that conspiracy theories with this 
exaggerated element no longer appeared. The system-inclusion consciousness, 
at least at the highest level, was now no longer accompanied by a system-
instability consciousness. 
Also connected with this are the changes on the security side of the securi-
ty/conspiracy binomial: Karl Härter has pointed out in several contributions 
that for the German-speaking world, the governing objective of “security” 
becomes completely dominant in the cameralist theory and practice of the 
policey-type administration and that, precisely towards the end of the 18th 
century, it increasingly replaces, supplements or is combined with the older 
eudemonistic state objective of happiness (Härter 2003; 2010). In the early 
                                                             
2  In this, Durtertre is implicitly supporting the point made by Bercé (1996, 1-5): The latter 
stated that during the 18th century, conspiratorial action against the state declined; how-
ever, Campbell (2004, 202) argued that this was true only for the highest level of coup 
d’état actions, while on the level of courtier rivalry, competition between branches of noble 
families etc. the amount of conjuration/conspiracy/cabal was still high during the 18th cen-
tury. But Durtertre identified with an – already very large – notion of conjura-
tion/conspiracy: only those against the legitimate government of a state, while many exam-
ples by Campbell fade smoothly into the smaller scale of cabal and intrigue.  
3  The political sciences reconstruct the transfer of the state-system way of thinking from Italy 
to Europe and on to the wider world as the expansion of a system and the incorporation of 
ever more sovereign states (e.g. Armitage 2007, Reus-Smit 2011, 209-12). The process is 
surely more complex. An appropriate model should, conversely, also formulate the expulsion 
of potential candidates at the end of aristocratic society. 
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Enlightenment, Leibniz in 1670 makes a central conceptual distinction between 
internal and external security, which then becomes a standing notion. The 
political economies of Europe – the French physiocracy and économie poli-
tique in a similar way to the German and Italian cameralism – now increasingly 
conceive the (albeit ideal) normal condition of their societies and states to be 
that of complete security. Apart from external security from war and subjuga-
tion, administrations tended to establish state institutions against insecurity 
based on crime, malnutrition, disease, and also natural disasters. If we take the 
example of state-biased insurances as an indicator of the development of secu-
rity production devices, the notion of civil society based on the social contract 
enters the scene here: society is seen as an accumulation of individuals obligat-
ed to one another to (anonymous) solidarity in insurance institutions and there-
by in “risk societies” in their proper and literal sense. Society as a whole was to 
disconnect itself from natural afflictions of all kinds from its environment, at 
least on the level of values (Zwierlein 2011; cf. Kaufmann 2012). As a minor 
German administrative philosopher formulated in the 1780s, it was only nowa-
days, in enlightened times, that one  
does not aspire [sc. to stabilize] the inner security [of a state] by the external 
security but vice versa, the external by the inner, because it has been realized 
that those states where the best possible police institutions were to be found 
usually also had the most potential instruments to procure security from exter-
nal threats and to guarantee its duration (Pfeiffer 1780, 5). 
The literature on all these topics is immense, but only in a few, mostly more 
recent contributions, is direct attention given to the state objective of security.4 
In all this, however, “conspiracies” hardly ever appear as a threat to these areas 
of inner security. Certain robber bands might be described as “conspiracies” in 
the micro-arena, but harvest devastations, fires or storms are not described as 
conspiracies against internal state security, either by God or by nature, in cam-
eralist literature. 
It can be said, therefore, that the 18th century was a low point for our heuris-
tic pairing of security/conspiracy: it was a time in which the – albeit still unfin-
ished according to Jellinek’s classical definition, or even non-existent accord-
ing to Osiander’s (2009) somewhat extreme argumentation – princely state was 
at least able to dominate perception to the extent that transcendental threat 
elements faded from the above-mentioned system-consciousness. Insecurity in 
the European state system and, from the perspective of the individual state, 
external and internal security themselves, seemed relatively plannable, in spite 
of all the imponderables. 
                                                             
4  For an overview of the transition from happiness to security in Enlightenment state objec-
tive theory, with many references to literature which are not included here cf. Zwierlein 
(2011b). 
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The 18th century as the century of Enlightenment, however, also prepares 
the next step, which leads to a new boom and configuration of securi-
ty/conspiracy during the French Revolution. To characterize this briefly: The 
revolutionary conspiracy thinking had a dialectic form which was something 
like the inverse effect of a Rousseauian social contract thinking: since the revo-
lution imagined the new society to be formed as the metaphysical amalgama-
tion of men transformed into the state of civilization and all acting as imple-
menters of the single, indivisible “general will”, they necessarily imagined 
every real or supposed action against that general will to be a similar “single, 
indivisible, pervasive enemy and imagined a death struggle with this opposite, 
whose supposed power and coherence vastly exaggerated the tangible evi-
dence.”5 We could say, in a rather Schmittian way, that the dichotomy of strug-
gle between the True Church and the Antichrist as mastermind operator during 
the confessional age was replaced by the secularized dichotomy of revolution-
ary civil society on the one hand and the counter-revolutionary conspiracies of 
traditionalism and despotism on the other. Conspirators are “une faction 
d’ennemis de la liberté”.6 We read in hundreds of texts at that time of “con-
spirations” that are made by “an Austrian Committee”, by “une secte de con-
spirateurs”, by “philanthropists”, by “50,000 brigands”, by the “Jacobins”, by 
Louis XVI and his followers, and later also by Robespierre himself who was 
said to have made himself king. The revealing actor also changes with the 
passing of time: it is the “Tribunal révolutionnaire”, some representatives in the 
Assemblée nationale or the “Comité de sûreté générale”, the committee of 
general security: there we have our opposition of security and conspiracy. In 
1792 the “conspirations” of the “prétendu comité autrichien” “se trament contre 
la sûreté générale, dont votre comité de surveillance est expressément chargé 
de recueillir les traces”.7 Here we have the direct opposition of conspiracy and 
the security of the nation or even of civilized mankind. Conspiracies are made 
against the progress of civilization itself. 
At this point it seems useful to generalize this new constellation of security 
and conspiracy, which we called above en passant “Schmittian”. Perhaps even 
more helpful (but still Schmittian) is to come back to Koselleck’s Kritik und 
Krise (1959). Koselleck wrote this early work under the clear influence of Carl 
Schmitt’s Leviathan (1938), but he understood his work in particular to be a 
sort of historical explanation of the present-day Cold War, a fact which is often 
                                                             
5  This is the ingenious summary of Furet’s position by Lucas (1996, 769) (without citing him), 
who himself insists that if this is a correct description of the “Jacobin mind-set” and of the 
Terror, one should not take the Jacobins to be “the only – or the only true – revolutionar-
ies”. 
6  Archives parlementaires 1792, XLIV, 38. – Kaunitz, who with his renversement des alliances 
is judged to have undergone his “noviciat en machiavélisme” there (cf. for Kaunitz: Schilling 
1994, for the topic of Machiavellism: Zwierlein 2010b with many further references).  
7  Archives parlementaires 1792, XLIV, 33. 
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forgotten in its reception (cf. Scheurmann 2002, Missfelder 2006; for Schmitt’s 
circle in post-war Germany cf. Van Laak 2002, for Koselleck cf. Daniel 2006, 
Olson 2012). Seen from a liberal-conservative perspective, the book was relat-
ed in spirit to Jacob Talmon’s (Talmon 1952; 1957) or even Hofstadter’s his-
toricizing diagnostics of the times. The basic structure of the essay, which 
ultimately condenses almost 400 years of European history, is that of a double 
large epochal shift which, for the first step, broadly followed Schmitt’s logic of 
neutralizations (Schmitt 1932; Ottmann 2003; Zwierlein 2011c): the (Hobbesi-
an, so to speak) state, as a neutral ruling power, supersedes the confessional 
parties of war. The state had, with its bourgeois functional elite (mainly law-
yers) created a successful counter-power against the – in some cases confes-
sionally divided – estates and nobles. With this bourgeois functional elite, 
however, the state at the same time created its own eventual destroyer, in a 
second dialectical process: the citizens founded a morality which was separate 
from politics, a society which was separate from the state and apparently ini-
tially neutral, and, above all, created the bourgeois utopia of human develop-
ment which ultimately leads to the dissolution of the state. Since then, at the 
latest since the French Enlightenment, various rival bourgeois utopias compet-
ed with each other, always with a teleological historical-political backbone, 
whether this was a liberalist conception of economic progress or a variant of 
communist utopias. In this way, for him, the macro-conditions of the 1780s and 
of the 1950s were directly connected. One may criticize some of Koselleck’s 
approaches and interpretations, including his concept of state, but his reference 
to a distancing between state and society in the perception of the actors and the 
significance of temporalized secular teleological models of history and the 
future are surely important. 
It should also be mentioned that both Koselleck and Hofstadter single out 
the Illuminati as a prime example: For Hofstadter, the fear of the Illuminati – 
the dissolution of whom, by the Duke of Bavaria, was described in an emotion-
al pamphlet in 1797 in English with the title Conspiracy Against All the Reli-
gions and Governments of Europe [...] – created the typical structure of Ameri-
can “paranoid style of politics”. For Koselleck, Adam Weishaupt’s Illuminati 
were the best example of a pre-revolutionary bourgeois illusion, which was 
formed within the utopia of an already-present, natural and legitimate historical 
process of stages, from the natural state via the current absolutist state to a 
stateless society, and which was characterized by the absence of active revolu-
tionary plans, instead beginning a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy solely in the 
organization and peaceful, secret propagation of the order of Illuminati. The 
French Revolution was thus interpreted not as a civil war but as a “fulfillment 
of moral postulates” (Koselleck 1959, 156), as a process which necessarily 
obeyed the laws of history – and similarly, in Koselleck’s present day, the 
fundamental principle was the global conflict between the USA and the USSR 
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as state/imperial emanations of two respectively opposing ideological progress-
related philosophies of history. 
Important for our purposes – without, as already mentioned, embarking on a 
detailed criticism of a text whose concepts are now more than 60 years old – is 
this reference to the separation of (bourgeois) society and (monarchical/estate-
based) state and the autonomization of society as a subject of history, at the 
same time replacing the older cyclical models of historical structure with pro-
gressive sequences of steps. The result is namely that a system-instability con-
sciousness seems to rejoin again the system-inclusion consciousness – particu-
larly strongly, it seems, in the later Enlightenment and in the Revolution. 
Perhaps a more precise formulation would be as follows: The first system-
inclusion consciousness, which was related primarily to the political world of 
states and the state system, with its (to a limited extent) pluriform actors, and 
which began in the Renaissance, was equipped by the emerging information 
public sphere with an observational instance which enabled the perception of 
interdependencies, but also of contingencies and instabilities. Now, with the 
Enlightenment, a next advance of the public sphere seemed to consist of an 
autonomization of the bourgeois sphere itself – still not necessarily interpreted 
as a criticism of the existing ruling system.8 The information public sphere now 
included art, science, crafts, economy, technology – everything that bourgeois 
Enlightenment communication knew. The initial effect, on the abstract level, 
was that bourgeois society experienced itself as a self-sufficient actor; princes 
might be significant for this communication as patrons, dedicatees or employ-
ers of the authors, but only fractionally as the object. Only by that, “society”, 
“civilization” or “humankind”, as the Scottish Enlightenment calls it, is emerg-
ing: as a macro-actor for whom the philosophies of history of Smith, Ferguson, 
Hume, Herder and the Illuminati are written. And now, in the politicization of 
the revolutions and of their preludes and aftermaths, the disconcerted old state 
could discover in the Illuminati conspirers in the sense of the old “plots”; above 
all, however, the new bourgeois society could in turn interpret the whole old 
state system as a conspiracy against it, as was exemplified in the few citations 
given above. And thirdly, various groups, parties, fellowships, bourgeois con-
fessions etc. could perceive each other as a whole, or individual actors and 
agents among them, as (bourgeois) conspirers and conspiracies against each 
other. 
With each of these new, and now fully modern, conspiracy theories, it is 
important to ask precisely what security is threatened here. It is often firstly the 
security of the nation, but sometimes also the security of cosmopolitan society, 
insofar as this could be imagined at this time. From the conservative side, how-
                                                             
8  The literature is immense. We would just point to Gestrich (1994), Melton (2001) and for a 
useful overview of the distinct media of the 18th century cf. Fischer, Haefs and Mix (1999). 
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ever, it can also be still the security of the perceived union between state and 
dynasty in a longer-standing tradition. 
One might initially assume that the rest of the 19th century does not com-
pletely fit into a linear course of history, but rather that the French Revolution 
phase was an exception with regard to this very specific opening up of a securi-
ty/conspiracy constellation. After all, the great prominence of anti-Jesuit con-
spiracy theories in the 19th century (Cubbitt 1993; 2013) would seem to argue 
for a kind of neo-confessional return of the constellation of the confessional 
age – just as the 19th century is often spoken of in general as a neo-
confessional era (Blaschke 2000). Mostly, however, it can be observed that 
anti-Jesuit conspiracy theories were launched by one of the bourgeois or post-
bourgeois progressive groups and that they identified the Jesuits as agents of 
the old system. They were regarded as enemies of the state and of society; 
concern was raised about the establishment of a state within the state, about the 
false indoctrination of youth, and the Jesuits’ alleged spy network; in the narra-
tives, however, they were no longer agents of the older super-causal instance of 
the Antichrist of the 16th/17th century. The worldview was no longer theologi-
cal-apocalyptical. As such, the appearances of anti-Jesuitism in both epochs are 
only at first glance isomorphic, but not homologous. 
The 19th century was also characterized by a pluralization of structurally 
similar conspiracy threats. As well as the forms of anti-Jesuitism, anti-
Semitism, and anti-anarchism, individual groupings, parties or groups were 
repeatedly identified as conspiracies by various sides, which reflects the new 
circumstance that the – ultimately bourgeois, although the aims were some-
times anti-bourgeois – system of associations, clubs and parties was constantly 
producing, in a completely new form, new actors who became the object of 
public attention. The confessional era knew nothing comparable to this – ex-
cept, at most, the particularly striking pluralization into sects and religious 
groupings in England in the 17th century. 
The security which was threatened was now adapted to the framework of 
nation states; initially, therefore, the fear applied to coups or threats to the 
nation state and to national society. Wherever threats to values (civilization, 
humankind) were expressed, or wherever the old state itself was denounced as 
a threat, transnational groups defending the security of something which was 
not yet institutionally tangible – for example, a communist society – were 
heard, admittedly usually vaguely. The transnational dimension of conspiracy 
and security seems to have gained significance particularly from the 
1870s/1880s on. 
2.4  No Speculation About the Future 
How, finally, should we characterize the latest developments in the relationship 
between security and conspiracy? Do we have a basically structurally un-
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changed continuation of the development since the threshold era of the Sat-
telzeit (1770 to 1830) described above, or is there a third, large threshold era – 
in general, and in particular for our constellation of security and conspiracy? 
Koselleck (1959) assumed the largely unbroken continuation of the new oppo-
sition of bourgeois progress utopias which began in 1770-1789, but his percep-
tion also reflected the spirit of the existing Cold War. There are a lot of reasons 
for situating a new epochal break either in 1945 or in 1990. This is evident at 
the level of the transformation of security conceptions and practices; the com-
munication-historical perspective would also argue in favor of this.  
Concerning ‘security’, a major shift occurred around 1945 with the emer-
gence of ‘national and social security’ in the form that was coined during the 
Roosevelt era in the US. That politics, at a first look, did strengthen the classi-
cal form of the internal/external security division by empowering the welfare 
state and the means of military defense. But other elements, like the global 
scope of the intelligence services, pointed already to a hybridization of that 
internal/external division. 
Since then, in the field of International Relations, a wealth of interconnected 
new principles such as extended, comprehensive or human security came up, all 
aiming at the replacement of the classical state security. Those new security 
regimes resulted in a corresponding duty of the UN or other ad hoc state com-
munities to provide humanitarian intervention (as the responsibility to protect). 
Within domestic politics, the extension of the functions of “police” and a blur-
ring and mixing of the functions of police and army can be ascertained. After 
9/11, the functions of ‘national security’ were re-enforced, but at the same 
time, the transnational scale of those ‘national security’ agendas became visible 
in new types of war. 
The ‘good’ counterpart of that transnationalized national security was the 
concept of “human security” that the UN Human Development Report de-
scribed as “safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and re-
pression. It also means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
pattern of our daily lives – whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communi-
ties or in our environments”. As subgroups of “human security”, it listed a 
number of “securities” such as “job security, income security, health security, 
environmental security, security from crime”, which were the “emerging con-
cerns of human security all over the world” (Human Development Report 
1994, 3). In 2003, the UN Commission on Human Security announced: 
The international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security. 
Why? Because the security debate has changed dramatically since the incep-
tion of state security advocated in the 17th century. According to that tradi-
tional idea, the state would monopolize the rights and means to protect its citi-
zens. State power and state security would be established and expanded to 
sustain order and peace. But in the 21st century, both the challenges to securi-
ty and its protectors have become more complex. The state remains the fun-
damental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil its security obliga-
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tions – and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people. That 
is why attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of 
the people – to human security (UN Commission on Human Security 2003, 2). 
According to this commission, the so-called “Westphalian System” was over, 
and the community of states was increasingly obligated not only to guarantee 
security between sovereign nation states as the only actors and addressees of 
international security politics, but also to address the individual security needs 
of the people, particularly in cases where dictatorships or “failing states” 
threatened or could no longer guarantee their security in all dimensions of life. 
At least three levels of thought about security are linked here: (1) the em-
phasis on the individual, (2) the inclusion and recognition of the needs of pre-
viously marginalized groups, (3) the extension of what are considered possible 
threats to security. Human security is mostly defined here in the abbreviated 
formula as freedom from fear and freedom from want and thus encompasses 
two dimensions: the dimension of protection (military if necessary) and the 
dimension of development policy. UN peacekeeping missions should become a 
stronger and more frequent instrument. The propagation and increasing ac-
ceptance of a new institution and legitimizing factor in international law, the 
responsibility to protect (rtp), was the next step: in 2001 the Canadian govern-
ment proposed the appointment of the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty by the UN, which then drafted a corresponding 
report. The idea behind rtp is to reverse the current procedure of legitimization 
of humanitarian interventions: the question of humanitarian intervention should 
no longer be central only from the perspective of the community of states look-
ing down “from above” on events in member states; rather, the first level 
should involve the responsibility of the home country to protect the population 
“from below”, vis-à-vis both its own population and the community of states. 
On the next level, if the home state infringes this obligation, the community of 
states itself has a responsibility to protect the population against the existing 
threats, and in case of doubt also against the illegal actions of the government 
of the home state itself (Paris 2001; Hampson and Penny 2007; Verlage 2009). 
The second dimension of the extended security concept (freedom from want) 
was articulated in particular in the above-cited expert report “Human Security 
Now” by the UN Commission on Human Security 2003. Its basic idea is that 
human security also means that each individual has a right to particular mini-
mal provisions with regard to food, energy, education, everyday security (e.g. 
from crime and even from unreasonably dangerous traffic) (UN Habitat Report 
2007). The catalysts for the freedom from fear dimension were the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994 and the Kosovo conflict in 1999. The catalyst for the freedom 
from want dimension was the Asian financial crisis of 1997 (Hampson et al. 
2001; Ulbert and Werthes 200;, Fröhlich and Lemanski 2011).  
After 9/11, it was not with recurrence to ‘human security’ that the US led to 
‘war against terrorism’ but rather with respect to a widened concept of ‘nation-
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al security’. Nevertheless, also in that case, the transnational elements became 
extremely strong; the so-called Westphalian system (cf. for a concise concept 
history of that notion Schmidt 2011) was challenged hardly by this enlarged 
classical security concept just as by avantgarde ideas like ‘human security’. 
Both developments seem to dissolve the division of internal and external secu-
rity which grew from the late Middle Ages and increasingly from the 17th 
century: to the erosion of the classical principle of sovereignty. It seems as if 
they implicitly carry in themselves the target horizon of a quasi-world govern-
ment by the community of states, in which everything is “internal security”. All 
those processes of extension of the concept of inter- and transnational security 
regimes were severely criticized and discussed which is not our topic here (cf. 
only MacArthur 2008; Krause 2005). It is enough to state here that there exists 
a bundle of overwhelming indices for a constant and massive drift of change 
which seem to have the dimension of opening really a new epoch of globaliza-
tion. 
At the same time, we live in an era characterized by a boom and dense pro-
liferation of conspiracy theories: 9/11 symbolically marks the opposition of 
both anti-Islamic and anti-American conspiracy theories, which have also been 
manifested in real actions, not dissimilarly to the opposition between anti-state 
anarchic conspiracy theories and anti-anarchic conspiracy theories in the 
1880s/1890s. However, given the complexity of the globalized present era, this 
is only one of several threat scenarios invoked by the security/conspiracy oppo-
sition. Anti-Western or anti-capitalist conspiracy theories by opponents of 
globalization or ultra-ecology groupings can be seen. All these combinations of 
security and conspiracy can be described in themselves at a loose crossover 
point between contemporary history and political science’s analysis of the 
present. According to the epoch-formation model that we have followed so far, 
however, the question is whether a truly new form of security/conspiracy is 
implied here or whether it is merely a case of variations on the older, fully 
modern form. 
According to the logic applied so far, we would have to be able to describe a 
development in communication history which, in a similarly fundamental way 
to a) the emergence of a transnational political information public sphere be-
tween the Renaissance and the 1560s and b) the emergence of bourgeois inter-
nal communication in the 18th century, generates a new form of perception of 
the world, which in turn produces a system-instability consciousness: in the 
first case this led to the observability of politics by religion and vice versa, i.e. 
of the political state system from outside, for example by confessionalized 
religious actors who, in a conspiracy theory, were able to reveal political actors 
as agents of the “real” apocalyptic enemy. In the second case, it led to the ob-
servability of the (absolutist) state by (bourgeois) society. It was possible to 
“reveal” all the agents of the Ancien Régime as conspirers against civilization’s 
progress. Although there is no doubt that in the last few decades, a new and 
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decisive communication revolution has been in progress with electronic media, 
in particular those that allow direct bi-directionality, especially the internet and 
its derivatives, we have to ask in the logic of this argument which new observ-
er-actor is “created” by this communication revolution, and how this observer 
then observes the previous old system and possibly reveals it as a conspiracy. 
What, then, takes the place of bourgeois society?  
There seems to us to be no generally accepted interpretation of this yet, and 
certainly none that would be broadly internalized by the actors themselves. 
Castells (1999) coined the term of network society, referring to the new form of 
de-collectivized, highly individualized workers and the replacement of indus-
trial capital by cultural capital; his three-volume work, however, ends rather 
vaguely: among others, ecology is identified as really new avant-garde move-
ment. Hardt and Negri (2000) can perhaps be viewed as authors of a newly 
developed form of neo-Marxist conspiracy theory: against a global, abstract-
mythical empire they posit as new actors the “multitude” who must demand 
political world citizenship – but is that a really new perspective? A third similar 
vision is expressed by Rosanvallon (2008; 2011) according to whom in recent 
years new forms of negative, deliberative and reflexive forms of popular con-
trol have arisen that both underscore and support a new form of critical civil 
society (based a.o. on the rise of social media), but on the other hand run the 
risk of destroying this civil society in a bundle of individualized, populist and 
consumerist virtual entities. In this new age of virtual particularity, not the 
state, the political parties or ideological bodies, nor even the ‘citizen’ in its 
classical definition, are the new actors in the conspiracy or security opposi-
tions. Rather, social media trends, disseminated in real time, are constantly and 
reflectively rehearsing and playing out a number of parallel universums at the 
same time. A threat can manifest itself in a virtual sphere, by means of imagi-
nation, without becoming ‘real’ in any physical sense at all, but this virtual 
threat still dictates political and public behaviour. Those are more or less con-
vincing descriptions about what is happening in a ‘risk society in the new me-
dia age’, but they do not indicate a clear new perspective with new contents. 
With respect to our argument developed above the question still remains, if 
there is really emerging a third level of observing perspective on the same scale 
as in the former steps of unfolding observabilities and conflict frontiers along-
side the politics/religion and Ancien Régime/Bourgeois society division. Some 
‘new phenomena’ seem to be interpretable along rather old schemes of observ-
ability and conflict patterns.9 Others do not seem to have (yet) the necessary 
                                                             
9  The fact that the Islamic world can observe the West and has been able for some time now 
to perpetrate terrorist attacks on it seems structurally only to be a repeat of the “observa-
bility” of politics by religion on a global level. 
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dominance.10 Many of the analyses brought forward currently come from spe-
cific political “corners”; we can only take them to be an indication of the idea 
that a similarly decisive social transformation is suspected to be emerging from 
the information technological transformations.  
All this lies in the future, and it is not appropriate for the historian to specu-
late about it; on the other hand, every historical investigation, model and thesis 
formation grows implicitly or explicitly out of the horizon of these uncertainly-
gauged current problems. So, it would be intellectually unfair not to mention 
them, as they are certainly, in a certain manner, incentives for the enterprise of 
this special issue and for the overall current interest of historical and social 
research in those issues. So, we have decided to include also analyses which 
are located at a fluid crossover point between contemporary history and politi-
cal science. However, for the latest phase, the outlined framework of historical 
development cannot yet be completed in a satisfying way. 
2.5  Security and Conspiracy, Real and Imagined 
Brief attention must also be given to a problem which concerns all the epochs 
dealt with: in the following, and also above in the construction of an epoch-
sequence model, are we dealing only with security discourses or also security 
practices? Are we talking about real conspiracies or only about fictitious con-
spiracies and conspiracy theories? The approach taken here is that these ques-
tions are misleading and are the wrong ones to ask. Feelings of security or 
insecurity, riotous gangs, “secret” meetings of several against many or against 
one ruler have always been in existence everywhere since there have been 
hominids. Such units only have a historical dimension if they are observed in 
the framework of general, larger developments in society, as carried out above. 
For the historian, an epoch’s descriptions of itself as interpreted through 
sources on the topic of “security and conspiracy” should have a certain indica-
tive function, which is why in this introduction, emphasis has always been 
placed on the etymological and conceptual history – even if it is clear that the 
lack of use of the word “securitas” as a descriptive term in a given epoch does 
not necessarily mean that it is not possible to write security history for that 
epoch. In the case of conspiracies, the fully formulated conspiracy narratives 
and conspiracy theories which circulated as autonomous texts (or in other me-
dia) in the respectively available public sphere should be better indicators to 
                                                             
10  Ecological politics, with their implicit leading division and conflict frontier ‘ecological 
equilibrium vs. human progress’, do possess perhaps such a new vision and have also an im-
age of history and future which is at least partly no longer progressive. However, the hesi-
tant beginnings of such thinking and of the party formations since the 1980s together with 
the current pragmatic implementations of various parties within the classical political sys-
tems do not yet allow us to discern the nature of a general “great transformation” which 
would be structurally comparable in size to that of the third estate in bourgeois society. 
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trace the limits and possibilities of an epoch than the reconstruction and analy-
sis of a rebellion or plot itself, since acts of violence and group formations 
alone are often difficult to locate semantically: is it a case of an old aristocratic 
grouping, a modern-era secret society or a party formation? In transition phas-
es, this is difficult to decide. In the farthest-reaching conspiracy theories of a 
given time, on the other hand, one can see which “super-causal instances” are 
used as ordering systems, and which interpretations and counter-narratives are 
specifically intended to make people understand events in a different way: a 
dynastic marriage and a political union, for example, as pieces of the mosaic of 
what is actually a Papist/Antichrist plan; a meeting in an aristocratic salon as 
preparation for a monarchical anti-revolutionary conspiracy. In this respect, the 
methodological openness to the discourse-analytical dispositive approach and 
also the attention given to the linguistic-narrative side of conspiracy theories in 
this HSR Special Issue is justified by the topic: there seems to be a clear point 
of entry for a historical dimension here. Our (admittedly not quantifiable) as-
sessment is that eras with a high circulation frequency of conspiracy theories 
are clearly often also eras of high frequency of actual assassination attempts, 
complots, and conspiratorial network formations – although it remains a diffi-
cult task to discern between origin and consequence. Precisely for the question 
of how security, security planning, security institutions and precautions of a 
given society react to “conspiracy”, it is important not to place the real-or-not-
real question at the point of departure (or even at all), since the reaction to 
conspiracies in terms of social security production takes place long before and 
long after the real manifestation of acts of violence. 
2.6  Summary 
We will summarize this sketch of the indicated development of security and 
conspiracy, their relationship to each other and their conditioning by the media 
system for Modern History in Table 1. 
3.  Brief Remarks about the State of Research 
To our knowledge there exists no monographic or collective attempt to thema-
tize the relationship between security and conspiracy, with equal attention 
given to each, over several epochs. This makes it necessary for us to give some 
consideration consecutively to the state of research of security history and the 
state of research of conspiracy (theory) history, even if, in the case of security 
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3.1  Security History 
With the usual sense of important issues and the universalist approach of the 
Annales school, Lucien Febvre claimed as early as 1955 the necessity of a 
history of the “sentiment de securité” encompassing religious, economic, polit-
ical and social aspects of security production (Febvre 1955). Mainly he insisted 
on the religious history of security in faith and on the history of insurances, the 
latter issue having been raised by Jean Halpérin four years before. Jean De-
lumeau then partly replied to that demand by writing histories of one possible 
opposite to the feeling of security: fear (Delumeau, 1978; 1983; 1989). But 
these works concentrated on the impact that the Reformation and the confes-
sional schism in Europe had on the inner feelings of men, and how instruments 
like the Catholic confession and Protestant church discipline formed Early 
Modern characters. Their main impulse and inquiry adhered to a framework of 
questions raised since the 1960s by Foucault with his “surveiller et punir”, by 
Elias with his civilization process or by Oestreich with his concept of Sozi-
aldisziplinierung (Oestreich 1968; Schulze 1988): very different approaches, 
but in their main interest in discipline, the impact of force on human feeling 
and also fear, they belong to an intellectual heritage of a generation of men 
born in the 1920s – too young to have been involved in the very first ranks of 
decision-making or military forces during the Second World War, but old 
enough to have experienced personally that society of militarization, oppres-
sion and fear – from very different perspectives (cf. Miller 2002). It seems that 
this heritage as well as the intellectual impact of the Cold War situation, where 
the structure of International Relations was minimized to variations of always 
the same bipolar form, led to a strong concentration on internal affairs in the 
political and social sciences and in the humanities. With the exception of Oes-
treich, none of those (somewhat but not completely arbitrarily chosen) three 
works looked at inter-state war or religious fundamentalism. Where Oestreich 
treated war and even confessional war, he concentrated once again on military 
discipline and on neo-Stoic elements of transconfessional arguments; some-
thing as irrational as conspiracy theories was not his subject. And Foucault 
concentrated on the irrationality of rational state machines but likewise not on 
conspiracy theories. Not only was the focus of these theoretical agenda-setters 
on the internal relationship between man and powers like the state or other 
machines of discipline; but also, for example, the agenda in the avant-garde 
field of the 1960s/70s in historical studies, social history, was always explicitly 
the priority of internal over foreign affairs. So, if “security” was a topic to be 
touched upon, it was neither in the sense of a general new field to be opened, 
nor was it integrating foreign and internal affairs of states, commonwealths or 
groups and their history. Probably, neither Delumeau nor any other author 
working in that field would have understood his work as belonging primarily to 
a “security history”. At the end of his life Foucault did address, in his lectures 
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on governmentality, the topic of “Sécurité, territoire, population”; but only 
some of these lectures (mainly the important 4th one) were known to a wider 
public before 2004. And again, the focus was on internal security production. 
So, from the methodological inspirations of cultural and social sciences in 
general and of historical research in particular in the 1970s/80s, no direct path 
led to anything like a general security history. 
There was, surely, a field of historical research that was of quite central in-
terest in those years and that would have to be addressed as belonging to such a 
field: the history of social security or of social insurances, mainly since the late 
19th century. As the Bismarck system was historically the earliest, or at least 
played a leading role in international comparison, research was strong here, 
focusing mainly on the development of its central institutional framework and 
also laying the path for research on related institutions like e.g. social insuranc-
es for mining workers (cf. Tennstedt 2009; Hennock 2003; Gräser 2009; Beck-
er 2010; Hockerts 2011 for current historical overviews and states of research). 
For U.S. history, similar important topics in research had been the 1935 Social 
Security Act, Roosevelt’s politics of the New Deal, the Philadelphia conference 
in 1944 of the International Labour Organization and the inclusion of “social 
security” as a universal human right into the UN Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights of 1948 (Art. 22). For example, for the American New Deal 
politics of the 1930s/40s, which prepared the Social Security Act of 1935, it 
was emphasized that “Job security, life-cycle security, financial security, mar-
ket security – however it might be defined, achieving security was the leitmotif 
of virtually everything the New Deal attempted“ (Kennedy 1999, 365). The 
thesis was put forward that the same policy, under the influence of war, then 
prepared the harder line of the National Security State with the Act of the same 
name and with its bodies, the National Security Council and the CIA in 1947 
(Hogan 1998). In this field in general, biographical, event-historical and institu-
tion-historical approaches always dominate (e.g. Daalder and Destler 2009; 
May and Zelikow 2009; Monje 2008), while more exact investigations e.g. of 
the governing objectives and concepts of the policy are lacking. Stuart (2008) 
recently pointed out that after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 should be judged as probably the most important law in Amer-
ican post-war history, but that in comparison with the former, there was much 
less research on this law. Miller (2008), under the impression of the latest de-
velopments after 9/11, presented a historical investigation of the Church Com-
mission, which inspected the working methods of the Intelligence Services in 
1975. 
As well as this area of the history of social security systems, there are some 
research publications on the area of external security policy (Militärgeschicht-
liches Forschungsamt 1982-1997). In the area of the recently – since the end of 
the Cold War and the opening of relevant archives – booming history of state 
secret and security services, on the other hand, it is conspicuous that in many 
HSR 38 (2013) 1  │  34 
monographs and collections, a reflection on the name-giving concept of “secu-
rity” in these institutions is lacking (cf. for the East German Staatssicherheit 
e.g. Gieseke 2007; Leide 2005; Mampel 1996; Herbstritt and Müller-Enbergs 
2003; Suckut 2009). 
If in contemporary history of the social security systems, “security” was lit-
erally an object of research, for other topics and for earlier periods in general 
the issue of “security” was touched upon much more rarely. Huge historical 
projects of editing sources of foreign politics, like the editions of the Richelieu 
papers or of the Peace of Westphalia (Richelieu 1982-2003, Acta Pacis West-
phalicae), concentrated on other terms. 
Concerning the conceptual history of security, Werner Conze’s contribution 
of 1984 must still be noted as a departure point in that field, while there were 
not many follow-up studies, and this article was restricted to German political 
language only (Conze 1984; Istinsky 1952). Daase (2012) urged the adoption 
of the method of conceptual and political language history into the political 
sciences, but it is only recently that this call has been followed up by case stud-
ies (e.g. security culture/guilt culture). 
As has now been frequently mentioned, the state of research on security his-
tory is poor. The crucial question is where and how to start a new general secu-
rity history. In contemporary history, the epoch for which some research does 
already exist, the necessity of a new beginning has been stressed but with dif-
ferent approaches: Conze (2005) argues for a prudent use and historicization of 
the terms of political sciences as heuristic devices, while Rödder (2007) argues 
against it, supporting traditional hermeneutic approaches. Our own attempts in 
this field have opted for the first solution in trying to historicize to this date 
some selected notions like human security (Zwierlein et al. 2010; Zwierlein and 
Graf 2010; Patzold 2012), insurability (Zwierlein 2012), energy security (Graf 
2010), food security (Collet 2010), securitization (Conze 2012). 
For a new history of security, it should be helpful not only to historicize in-
dividual approaches, concepts or terms of security, but also in most cases to 
investigate specific fields of opposites and oppositions to “security”: in this 
way, the otherwise rather amorphous concept is immediately more strongly 
defined. This does not have to be meant in the sense that, following Koselleck, 
one would have to choose only classical “asymmetrical antinomies” (such as 
Greek/Barbarian, civilized/barbaric) necessarily on one and the same taxonom-
ic level. Thus, the opposition between “security and conspiracy” has been 
chosen here, in which the second concept is clearly far more specific and par-
ticular than the first. This means, however, that the binomial fulfils all the more 
clearly a heuristic limiting and specifying function. As demonstrated above, 
with appropriate definition, it leads to a concentration on either the ancient, the 
late medieval or in particular the modern era. 
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3.2  Conspiracy History 
While the question of why security history does not have its own domain in 
historical studies is fitting, since the corresponding thematics are given in other 
disciplines and since they are of great general relevance, a comparable argu-
ment for a history of conspiracies and conspiracy theories can of course not be 
made on this general level. They provide, rather, a particular topic and a specif-
ic focus, since they are of course opposed to “security” (as a threat), but they 
present only one of many imaginable opposition elements. 
The increased presence of the topic “conspiracy/conspiracy theory” in histo-
ry and the social sciences did not begin with the explosion of literature in the 
aftermath of 9/11 mania, which is documented by a wealth of volumes (e.g. 
Knight 2002, Melley 2000, Barkun 2003); social scientific and historical re-
search had already given attention to this topic in the Cold War phase, spurred 
on by an essay which appeared approximately at the same time as the above-
mentioned epoch-forming study, Koselleck’s Kritik und Krise: Hofstadter’s 
Paranoid Style in American Politics of 1963/4. It was a fulminant essay which 
made a distinction historically between American anti-Catholic 19th-century 
conspiracy theories and American anti-Communist ones of the Cold War era, 
but which did not present a developed concept of how conspiracy theories had 
developed in the longue durée. He methodologically transferred the clinical 
psychological term of paranoia onto a style of politics, and at the end of the 
essay he even indicated that he believed this to be actually a supra-historical 
category, applicable to all eras (Hofstadter 1964, 38-9). Nonetheless, he had 
made the topic prominent, and he also already made a brief mention of the 
significance of media conditions (ibid., 24).  
A number of political and social science publications were prompted by this. 
Recently attention in social sciences has turned to both the existence of ‘real 
existing conspiracies’ as to the social functions and discursive and constructive 
dimensions of conspiracy thinking (Kirby 1997; Miller 2002 and Basham 2001, 
Van Buuren and De Graaf 2013). However, these social scientists tend to forget 
that the social function of conspiracies is not tied to the 21st century, or to the 
rise of social media, but can be identified in earlier ages as well. 
In the field of history, as mentioned above (Section 2.2), it was predomi-
nantly historians of the French Revolution who made conspiracies the object of 
historical research; following them was e.g. Geoffrey Cubitt for the Restoration 
(Cubitt 1993). In the 1990s some contributions and conferences were dedicated 
to this topic (Briggs 1990; Bercé and Guarini 1996; Monier 1998), and more 
recently there appeared Coward and Swann (2004), Campbell, Kaiser and 
Linton (2007), Horn and Rainbach (2008). The older historical research on 
anarchism and terrorism on the 19th century did not place conspiracy theories 
so much in the foreground. 
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The definition of conspiracy theory which is usually discussed in recent lit-
erature is that of the philosopher Keeley (1999), as follows:  
A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of some historical event (or 
events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of 
persons – the conspirators – acting in secret. [...] It proffers an explanation of 
the event in question. It proposes reasons why the event occurred.  
This definition has since been criticized on several sides (cf. Clarke 2002); 
nonetheless, it figures as one of the first more general attempts at definition. 
The problem with the definitions currently discussed is that they are presented 
mostly from the philosophical or sociological point of view, and thus typically 
tend to have little reflection on a historical dimension of the emergence, devel-
opment of and changes to conspiracy theories – in Clarke (2002, 147), there is 
a consideration of “evolutionary biological dispositions” of conspiracy theories 
in humans; for Hofstadter 1964, the basic idea was a kind of supra-historical, 
cyclically appearing psycho-social form of political style. A truly historicizable 
definition of conspiracy theory has scarcely been attempted, cf. Zwierlein 
(2013) in this volume. 
In many of the older contributions but also some recent ones, there is not 
always a clear distinction between concepts – even between “conspiracy” and 
“conspiracy theory” – and the definition of the object often remains vague. 
Particularly if “conspiracies” are addressed for example for the rural population 
or for aristocratic society in the pre-modern era, automatically an often very 
vaguely differentiated connection is made between the object and medieval 
cooperative or noble conjurationes. In what way and to what extent this con-
nection exists and such conjurationes are structural precursors or models for 
the conspiracy theories of the modern era, which include in recent and contem-
porary history in particular “terrorist” networks and conspiracy fictions or 
invented conspiracy theories such as the anti-Semitic hate propaganda writings 
of the “Elders of Zion”, is unclear so far. 
More decisive, however, is probably the step from such conspiracies and 
groupings in themselves as social-structural frameworks towards a specific 
rhetorical and also narrative form of conspiracy theories, which on various 
levels of secret, semi-public and public communication themselves become 
elements of historical agency. This often happens independently of well-known 
“authors” to whom the respective theory may be ascribed, since this communi-
cation form is usually characterized by anonymity, which in itself is a decisive 
element of the effect of the communication of such theories. Only once con-
spiracy theories have achieved such a degree of “independent existence” does 
the question of the relationship between “really existing” conspiracy groups 
and the “theories” and thus between “reality” and “fiction” become meaning-
ful, a question which is repeatedly addressed in the relevant literature. 
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4.  This HSR Special Issue 
This HSR Special Issue puts the accent on developments since the late 19th 
century; contributions have been collected in relatively close chronological 
order and thematic content, including contributions from young researchers 
who are investigating security/conspiracy constellations in the context of ter-
rorism and assassination attempts (De Graaf 2013; Ditrych 2013; Hof 2013, 
Van Buuren 2013) or of the communism syndrome (Hijzen 2013; Keesman 
2013), which already interested Hofstadter. Van der Heide (2013) ends the 
volume with an investigation into the conspiracy narrative which influenced 
U.S. policy in legitimizing the Iraq war. Many of these case studies deal with 
Dutch examples, since they come from the environment of the Center of Secu-
rity and Terrorism Studies of the University of Leiden. For the approach taken 
by this issue, it is significant that the focus in each case is strongly on conspir-
acies and conspiracy narratives in opposition to security as an international 
yardstick and in international networks and relationships: an approach which is 
often lacking in the literature cited above. 
This section of case studies from the 1880s to 2001 is preceded by a section 
which presents a mixture of contributions using a particular methodology 
and/or reaching back to the Early Modern era. Cubitt (2013) resumes the object 
of his study of 1993, the Jesuit conspiracy theories of the French Restoration 
period, and reconsiders it with the aid of Buzan and Waever’s securitization 
theory. Härter (2013) looks primarily from the security side at the phenomenon 
that in the 19th century, at the same time as and counter to the ever stronger 
development of the nation-state, equal work was done on developing inter-
national means of guaranteeing security for the prosecution of criminals and 
alleged criminals: conspiracies and the circulation of “conspiracies” by anar-
chists and other groups functioned as legitimization for taking police pursuit to 
an international level. Hamilton (2013) uses a comparative-literary perspective 
to present his new approach in security studies of a “philology of care” by 
means of a close analysis of Donnersmarck’s film “The Lives of Others”: he 
demonstrates, in this prime example of a film operating with security services 
and conspiracy fear, the hidden presence of the old etymological root of securi-
tas: care, care-free, care of others, care of the state. 
Thus the period briefly structured in this introduction through the develop-
ment of the security/conspiracy relationship is covered by means of different 
examples. 
The contributions are the result of a conference in Den Haag, which was or-
ganized by the editors and was substantially financed by the Project ‘Histori-
cizing Security. Enemies of the state, 1813 until present’ (Netherlands Organi-
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sation for Scientific Research, NWO).11 Thanks to Bochum assistants Svenja 
Römer and Max Ammareller for support in editing the contributions. English 
proof-reading by Angela Billington. Thanks also to the North Rhine-
Westphalian Academy of Sciences, Humanities and the Arts in Düsseldorf 
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